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Vioxx Scandal Sparks Criticism of the FDA
The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") is supposed to
protect consumers from pharmaceutical companies that might
otherwise be tempted to market unsafe drugs. But it was Merck &
Co. ("Merck"), and not the FDA, who took Vioxx, its blockbuster
arthritis medication, 10 3 off the market on September 30th after studies
showed that the drug was linked to between 88,000
and 139,000 heart
04
attacks, of which up to forty percent were fatal.'
A Merck memo uncovered in November showed that Merck
scientists were aware in 1996 that the drug might contribute to heart
problems. 0 5 Then in 2000, a Merck study found that patients taking
Vioxx were twice as likely to suffer heart attacks as patients taking
older painkillers. 0 6 Meanwhile, mid-level FDA officials who warned
of these dangers were shunned by the agency. 10 7 In FDA parlance,
those with a "point of view" 0on
Vioxx were unwelcome in certain
8
meetings concerning the drug.'
Dr. David Graham, an FDA scientist, testified before a Senate
Finance Committee on November 18th, that his superiors pressured
him to change his negative findings about the drug. F09 Graham, a 20year FDA employee, described the FDA as incapable of keeping
unsafe drugs off the market because of its cozy relationship with the

John Carey, Amy Barrett, & Carol Marie Cropper, Lessons from the Vioxx
Fiasco, BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 29, 2004, at 42 ("How could a drug get to $2.5
103

billion in annual sales despite evidence that it caused heart problems?").
104

An Ailing, FailingFDA, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2004, at B 10.

105

Id.

106

Carey, supra note 103.

Sadly, Vioxx's primary benefit over older

medicines was realized by only the small percentage of patients who would have
experienced stomach bleeding on the older medicines. Id.
107 An Ailing, FailingFDA, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2004, at B10.
108 Id.

At least one commentator compares the situation to that of the CIA
officials who questioned evidence that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction
were shunned during the run-up to the Iraq war. Id.
109 Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, FDA Scientist Says He Faces Retaliation, L.A.

TIMES, Nov. 25, 2004, at 26.
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pharmaceutical industry. 1 0 "The scientific standards [the FDA]
applies to drug safety guarantee that unsafe and deadly drugs will
remain on the U.S. market.""' According to Graham's testimony, the
FDA considers a drug safe until its reviewers conclude otherwise
with ninety-five percent certainty.1 2 The FDA, he added,
"overvalues the benefits of the drugs it approves and seriously
undervalues, disregards and disrespects drug safety ...."'13
Graham specifically expressed concern about the safety of
five other drugs currently on the market-namely, Accutane, Bextra,
Crestor, Meridia, and Serevent.1 14 Predictably, the FDA responded
' 15
that Graham's views do not "reflect the views of the agency." "
However, the FDA did announce that the agency is taking steps to
reduce risks associated with Accutane and Bextra 16 Meanwhile,
Public Citizen's Health Research Group has written to the FDA twice
this year calling for the removal of Crestor (an aggressively marketed
cholesterol reducer) from the market because of a high-risk of kidney
7 European regulators have also
problems associated with the drug. 11
expressed concern with Crestor.1l1
Graham also criticized the FDA's organizational structure as

"o Id. Specifically, Graham described the FDA as "feckless and far too likely
to surrender to demands of drug makers." Politics & Policy Vioxx: FDA Official
Says Agency Cannot Protect U.S. Residents, American Political Network, Nov. 19.

2004.
11 Politics & Policy Vioxx: FDA Official Says Agency Cannot Protect U.S.

Residents, American Political Network, Nov. 19, 2004.
112 Id.

n3 Id. It will be interesting to see if the FDA's perceived inability to monitor
drugs in the U.S. market will undermine arguments against the importation of less
expensive Canadian drugs on safety grounds. See Debra Rosenberg, Health for
Life, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 6, 2004, at 72 (observing that the White House has relied on
the need for the FDA to ensure drug safety as its justification for resisting the
importation Canadian drugs).
114 Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, FDA, Drug Companies Deny Oversight Flaws,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2004, at Al.
115

Id.

116 Id.
117Id.; see also Press Release, Public Citizen, FDA Knew of Crestor Dangers

but
Approved
Drug
Anyway,
(June
24,
2004)
http://www.citizen.org/pressroom (last visited Dec. 13, 2004).
118 Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 109.
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part of the problem." 9 Oddly, it is the FDA's Office of New Drugs
which was responsible for monitoring the safety of Vioxx, the same
20
office that was responsible for approving the drug in the first place.
In the wake of so many thousands of deaths, consumers are left
wondering why the FDA would build-in such a conflict of interest
into its organizational structure. 12 ' Finance Committee Chair Chuck
Grassley (R-Iowa) suggested that he would introduce legislation to
correct this situation. 2 "It doesn't make any sense from an
accountability standpoint to have the office that reviews the safety of
drugs that are already on the market to be under the thumb of the
office that put the drugs on the market in the first place."1 2 3 Since
Graham's testimony, the editors of the Journal of the American
Medical Association have called for a new board, independent of the
FDA, to monitor the safety of drugs after they are in the market.124
While there is a necessary balancing that must take place
between getting drugs to patients in a timely manner and testing the
drugs long enough to ensure safety, there is simply no justification
for lax post-marketing oversight of approved drugs.' 2) The FDA

"9 Politics & Policy Vioxx: FDA Official Says Agency Cannot Protect U.S.

Residents, American Political Network Nov. 19, 2004. In the wake of Graham's
testimony reports have began to surface that the FDA is pressuring him to transfer
to another department within the FDA, one where he would not be doing drug
research at all. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, FDA Scientist Says He FacesRetaliation,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2004, at A26. Graham characterized the move as "a reprisal."

Id. Graham's trouble with his superiors at that FDA appears to go back to this
summer when he attempted to present his findings that there were potential
problems with Vioxx. Id. The FDA blamed Graham for the conflict saying that he
failed to follow agency procedure in submitting his findings for publication. Id.
Graham's former co-worker, Dr. Paul Stolley, says of Graham, "[W]hen there are
attempts to intimidate him, he resists. But he is not a bomb thrower. He is a good
citizen and a steady guy." Id.
'20 Politics & Policy Vioxx: FDA Official Says Agency Cannot Protect U.S.

Residents, American Political Network, Nov. 19, 2004.
121An Ailing, Failing FDA, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2004, at B 10.
122Politics & Policy Vioxx: FDA Official Says Agency Cannot Protect U.S.

Residents, American Political Network, Nov. 19, 2004.
123 ld.
124 Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, When New Drugs Go Wrong: Role of the FDA

Debated,L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2006, at A38.
121See John Carey, How to Prevent Another Vioxx, BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 13,

2004, at 42 (noting that "itisvery difficult to pick up infrequent effects" during
pre-approval testing).
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could require doctors' reports whenever patients appear to have been
harmed by a drug. Presently, doctors' reports are "voluntary and
haphazard" making comprehensive analysis of a drug's effects
virtually impossible.126 One wonders if the drug industry's tolerance
for incomplete data is reflective of an industry preference for
marketing drugs based profitability rather than effects. 2 Surely, drug
companies would not be so tolerant of incomplete financial data on
their drugs. Furthermore, incomplete data on harmful drugs would
seem to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail against drug
makers in court.
While the examination of the FDA continues, consumers of
new drugs will have no choice but to depend on the agency and the
drug companies themselves (and their fear of litigation) to monitor
drugs on the U.S. market. "To a real degree, the people who get the
drug in the first few years after its approval are being experimented
on," according to Dr. Brian L. Strom, a professor of biostatistics and
epidemiology at the University of Pennsylvania. 128 Consequently,
some doctors recommend that consumers avoid taking newer drugs in
favor of older, cheaper medicines.' 29 At the very least, consumers
should seek out doctors who actively keep up with the latest drug
research.1 3 Studies show that even when the FDA does issue
adequate warnings about negative effects of a particular drug many
doctors fail to pay attention. 13 Finally, consumers must keep in mind
that drugs are always a double-edged sword. 32
Even after extensive
1 33
use all the side effects of drugs are not known.
126Carey, supra note 125, at 42.
127 See Regulators Protect Dollars, Not People, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2004

("The Vioxx scandal further underscores the imbalance of corporate power in our
society ... Unrelentingly a friend of big business, President Bush sneers when he
says the words 'trial lawyer.' But given the cronyism and impotence of our
government agencies, who is safeguarding the public? If Bush wants to put trial
lawyers out of work, he should encourage regulatory agencies to protect us instead
of the bottom line.").
128 Alonso-Zaldiver, supra note 124.
129Carey, supra note 125.
130 Id.

131Id. (observing that in the 1990's the FDA repeatedly warned of doctors of
potentially fatal liver problems associated with Rezulin, yet doctors tested fewer
than five percent of patients as instructed).
132Id.
133 id.

